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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Innovation and new goods are important forces driving economic growth and increasing the welfare
of consumers. In regulated industries such as telecommunications, however, ﬁrms attempting to
introduce new services often must contend with restrictions designed more to protect the status
quo than to promote innovation. Despite the prevalence of such restrictions, little eﬀort has been
devoted to measuring the eﬀects of regulation on product innovation. Since Joskow and Rose
(1989) noted with distress a decade ago that such studies were virtually non-existent, the dearth
of empirical work on regulation and product innovation has largely remained. Notwithstanding,
quantiﬁcation of the impacts of regulation on innovation is vitally needed to inform public policy.
This study examines the eﬀect of a particular regulatory regime on the creation and introduction
of new telecommunications services. My contribution is twofold. First, I quantify the eﬀects of
regulation in a real-world regime, uncovering the extent to which regulation reduces innovation and
delays introduction of new services. Second, I develop an econometric model suitable for studying
the introduction of regulated goods. The model comprises an arrival process for innovation followed
by a correlated duration process for the regulatory delay that drives a wedge between innovation
a n di n t r o d u c t i o nt oc o n s u m e r s .
The literature looking at the eﬀects of regulation on innovation focuses almost exclusively
on cost reduction, or process innovation. Creating new goods–product innovation–has received
scant attention. The only empirical study of which I am aware looking at product innovation and
telecommunications regulation is Mueller (1993), who ﬁnds (non-econometric) evidence suggesting
that deregulation was successful at speeding new service introductions in Nebraska. There are a
few studies quantifying the impact of incentive regulation on process innovation. Taylor, Zarkadas
and Zona (1992), Greenstein, McMaster and Spiller (1995), and Ai and Sappington (1998) all ﬁnd
that incentive regulation of various forms (price caps, earnings sharing, etc.) generally speeds the
diﬀusion of telecommunications infrastructure compared with traditional rate of return regulation.
2Unlike these studies, which look at the means of providing a service, I look directly at the new
services that consumers purchase.
The data for the study are from the Comparably Eﬃcient Interconnection (CEI) regulation put
on dominant telecommunications ﬁrms wishing to oﬀer information services. The Bell Operating
Companies1 (BOCs) and AT&T have introduced enhanced services integrated with their networks
(such as protocol conversion, voice mail, and audiotext information services) on a restricted basis
since 1987. These services require access to the local telephone network to function. For example,
voice mail service for a household must intercept and reroute incoming calls. Because the carriers
were the sole suppliers of the necessary network elements, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) required assurance–via a lengthy approval process–that they were not taking advantage
of their monopoly position. The approval process begins when the carrier submits a plan to the
FCC oﬀering competitors “comparably eﬃcient interconnection” to the network. The CEI plan
theoretically allows rivals to oﬀer similar services, although the ﬁrms complain that the process
merely raises the cost of introducing a service. For an interim around 1992—1995 such detailed
plans and time-consuming approvals were not required. During that time, the carriers promised to
follow FCC-approved open network plans, and the FCC allowed them to introduce new enhanced
services with no special oversight. Section 2 describes the CEI regime in more detail.
Carriers likely found it more attractive to introduce new services in the interim of lighter regu-
lation (hereafter the “interim”). The CEI requirements reduced the expected proﬁt of introducing
a new service for at least three reasons. First, there are substantial direct costs of preparing a CEI
plan, which require great amounts of technical and legal staﬀ time. One BOC claims that the CEI
plan requirement is “the most signiﬁcant” regulatory burden imposed on BOCs’ enhanced service
operations.2 Second, the plan reveals information to potential competitors before the service is in-
troduced, allowing competitors to preempt the BOCs.3 Third, there are long delays associated with
plan approval–over 200 days on average, a long time in the rapidly advanced telecommunications
industry.4 Once proposed, the plans typically went through several rounds of public comment and
3rebuttals, and in six cases the FCC requested changes to the plans. The delay reduces the present
value of a proposed new service and allows competitors to beat the regulated ﬁrm to market. The
econometric model for innovation and introduction is presented in sections 3 and 4.
To see if the release from regulation spurred more innovation, I estimate a prediction interval
(PI) for the interim using data from the regulated periods (section 5.1). The actual number of
new services created during the interim lies outside the “regulated-conditions” PI, evidence that
t h eb e h a v i o ro ft h eﬁrm changed when released from the regulation. An alternative approach
(one typically followed in regulation studies) would be to use the data from both the regulated
and unregulated periods and to include a dummy variable (DV) for the interim. I choose the
PI methodology for three reasons, given in increasing order of importance. First, I have more
complete data for the regulated periods. During the interim I know only the total count of new
services, not when each occurred.5 Second, unlike a DV, the PI approach does not constrain
any coeﬃcients or even the parametric form of the model to be equal between the regulated and
unregulated periods. I place no restrictions on how the behavior of the ﬁrm might change. Finally,
the PI approach sets a higher hurdle for the data to cross before we accept evidence of structural
change. For example, under the DV approach, one might ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient for the interim
is statistically signiﬁcant but numerically small, so that the mean counts from the two periods
are close. Thus counts generated from the two periods will be nearly indistinguishable and the
evidence for structural change will not be convincing. The PI approach requires that the observed
count from the interim have a small probability of being generated from the regulated process–a
stricter test of structural change.
The analysis in section 5.1 bears out that some otherwise proﬁtable services are not ﬁnancially
viable under the CEI regime. The number of services the ﬁrms created during the interim is
60—99% higher than the model predicts they would have created if the stricter regulation had
still been in place. The smaller predictions are from models with ﬁxed eﬀects only; the larger
predictions control for covariates. Omitted variables tests indicate that the increase in services is
4not driven solely by demand, technological factors, or competition. In fact, controlling for these
factors strengthens the conclusion that innovation increased during the interim. A semiparametric
technique corroborates the prediction from the parametric models. In section 5.2, I also look at
the magnitude and determinants of product introduction delay caused by the regulatory review
process. The FCC is slower approving plans that are more complex, and approves second adopters’
plans 41% quicker than pioneers’ plans.
There also appear to be direct and indirect interactions in the model between innovation and
regulatory delay. The direct eﬀects include the ﬁnding that as expected regulatory delay increases,
the ﬁr m si n n o v a t el e s s .T h ed i r e c te ﬀects in the regulatory delay model go the other direction: the
more services in the regulatory inbox, the quicker approval is granted. The direct eﬀects are not
highly statistically signiﬁcant, so the conclusions remain tentative here. The indirect eﬀects show
up through positive estimated correlation between the innovation and regulatory delay parts of
the model (net of the direct eﬀects), possibly evidence of unobserved factors that cause both more
innovation and longer delays.
Using the estimated model to simulate the innovation and introduction process with and without
the CEI regulation and regulatory delay, I ﬁnd that ﬁrms would have introduced 62% more services
to consumers during the study period if the regulation had not been in place (section 6). This
projection exercise requires stronger assumptions than does the prediction interval exercise in
section 5.1, because it assumes a parametric form for innovation during the unregulated interim.
2 The Comparably Eﬃcient Interconnection Regime
Before 1986, the regulated telecommunications carriers were under a requirement of structural
separation: AT&T or any BOC wishing to oﬀer enhanced services was required to form a separate
subsidiary. The separation rules erected a wall between the monopoly segment of the industry and
the competitive segment, of which enhanced services were a part. Through the Computer III series
5of orders (1986—1989), the FCC allowed integrated provision of enhanced services.6
Computer III established a long-term goal, Open Network Architecture (ONA), and a short-
term plan, CEI, to open the dominant ﬁrms’ networks to competitors.7 To gain the FCC’s approval
to oﬀer enhanced services, a carrier had to fulﬁll two requirements. First, for each service it had
to develop a CEI plan to abide by certain safeguards. The CEI plan allowed enhanced service
providers (ESPs) comparable interconnection to the elements of the network used by the particular
enhanced service. Each proposed service necessitated a new CEI plan. Second, the carrier had to
develop a longer range ONA plan to open up the rest of their network by oﬀering all the individual
“building blocks” of the network to all customers. The FCC stated that after a carrier’s ONA plan
was approved, the requirement of structural separations would be lifted altogether, and individual
CEI plans would no longer be required.
The BOCs began to submit CEI plans to the FCC around the time the ban on gateway services
was removed in September 1987.8 In June 1990, a court case (California I) vacated the Computer
III orders, requiring the FCC to disallow development and introduction of new enhanced services
(although carriers were allowed to continue to oﬀer existing advanced services and to ﬁle for CEI
waivers). The FCC strengthened the safeguards criticized in the California I decision and resumed
the CEI regime in February 1992. In 1992 and 1993, the BOCs individually received ﬁnal approval
of their ONA plans and a waiver of all structural separations requirements, which granted the
freedom to oﬀer enhanced services without ﬁling CEI plans.
In October 1994, another court case, California III,e ﬀectively forced the FCC to reinstate
the CEI plan requirements. The FCC allowed the BOCs to continue to provide existing enhanced
services on an integrated basis. However, the BOCs were required to ﬁle retroactive CEI plans for
services introduced after the lifting of structural separation. The retroactive CEI ﬁlings in January
1995 thus provide an enumeration of new services during the remand period. Thereafter, the CEI
plan requirement remained in eﬀect for the BOCs until February 1999. In February 1999 the FCC
eliminated ﬁling and pre-approval of CEI plans, instead requiring only that the BOCs post CEI
6plans on the Internet for new or modiﬁed enhanced services.9 To avoid contamination of the data
by anticipation eﬀects, I use data only through 1997 for the innovation estimations.
Figure 1 depicts the observability of innovation in the data from the public record during the
CEI regime. The time line shows when enhanced services were being developed and introduced
by carriers and the activity is observable through CEI ﬁlings (the black areas), when services were
being developed and introduced but the activity is not observable in the public record until a later
date (the gray areas), and when development and introduction are disallowed (the white areas).
The extent to which the ﬁrms anticipated these regime changes aﬀects the interpretation of the
data; I explore this issue in section 6.
3 A Model for Regulated Service Innovation and Introduction
In the course of introducing regulated telecommunications services to subscribers, a ﬁrm goes
through two steps. The ﬁrm ﬁrst creates a new end-user service (possibly using technology devel-
oped by other ﬁrms); I refer to this as innovation. After innovation, the services are not introduced
to subscribers until they are approved by the regulator. In this paper innovation will always refer
to the point in time at which the ﬁrm has created the service; introduction will always refer to the
point at which the regulator has approved the service and allows the ﬁrm to oﬀer it to subscribers.
Modeling this progression requires a statistical framework that incorporates both steps; I use an
arrival process followed by a duration process. The arrival process generates the new services, and
the duration process determines the delay between innovation and introduction to consumers.
Merely applying a count model to new service introductions (i.e., the outcome of the second
step) would potentially bias inference about the impact of regulation. To be concrete, consider
the following example. Suppose in the data the number of new service introductions increases
after a regulatory regime change (the case in the present data). Without examining the innovation
and introduction processes distinctly, one could not distinguish two competing hypotheses: 1)
7innovation has not changed but regulatory delay has decreased; and 2) innovation has increased.
In the former case, the increase in the number of new services reﬂects the emptying out of the
regulatory queue and is a transient phenomenon. In the latter case, the increase in new services
may reﬂect a longer-lasting change in the ﬁrms’ behavior. The model I propose separates the
innovation and the delay processes and would detect (given enough data) any changes in either
innovation or regulatory delay.
The model presented in the next section is a generalized Poisson arrival process followed by a
generalized Weibull duration process. In particular, arrivals (innovation) follow a Poisson event
process. After arrival from the population of potential new services, a new service immediately
enters a Weibull duration process that determines the length of the time until regulatory approval
(see Figure 2). The hazard rate of the Weibull process is determined from time-varying covariates.
The conditional means of the distributions are modeled as exponential functions of economic,
demographic, and regulatory explanatory panel data.
The model is formally equivalent to an inﬁnite-server queuing model.10 The equivalence of
the model to a queuing system allows adaptation of a result from the queuing literature for the
projection exercise carried out in Section 6.
4 The Econometric Implementation
In this section I construct the likelihood of the data from the arrival and regulatory approval
processes, from which maximum likelihood (ML) parameter estimates may be obtained. The idea
of the model is simple, although the details require some care because the count and duration
observations do not match one for one as would be the case in most bivariate distributions. The
innovation of services generates count data. Regulatory delay time of each service generates du-
ration data. A bivariate unobserved heterogeneity term admits correlation between the counts
and the durations. The likelihood for the data is ﬁrst found conditional on the heterogeneity
8terms. The unobserved heterogeneity terms are then integrated out, resulting in the unconditional
likelihood. The model nests several simpler models, including independent standard Poisson and
Weibull models, thus allowing speciﬁcation testing.
To construct the likelihood, the marginal distributions and the nature of the correlation between
the count and duration processes must be speciﬁed. Let the number of arrivals in period t, t =
1,...,T,f r o mﬁrm k ∈ K a n do ft y p e` ∈ L,b entk`, a realization of a count (non-negative
integer) valued random variable. In the data, K ≡ {1,...,8} represents AT&T and the seven Bell
Operating Companies, and L ≡ {1,2,3} represents the type of CEI ﬁling (plans, amendments, and
waivers); descriptions of the ﬁling types are below in the data description section. The length of
period t, st > 0, is usually 0.25 (one quarter year) but may be less if the quarter is incompletely
observed. Denote by f(ntk`|u1t) the probability density function (pdf) of ntk`, conditional on ﬁrm
and type ﬁxed eﬀects α1k and α2`,c o v a r i a t e sxt,c o e ﬃcient vector β, and a random eﬀect u1t (the
notation suppresses explicit dependence on α1k, α2`, xt,a n dβ for simplicity). The simplest such
count process is the Poisson model with rate and pdf
λtk` =e x p
¡





f(ntk`|u1t)=e x p ( −stλtk` + ntk` log(stλtk`))/ntk`! (2)
respectively. The random eﬀect u1t, for simplicity taken to be common across ﬁrms and types within
a period, is an unobserved heterogeneity term with variance τ2
1 ≥ 0. Assume that E(eu1t)=1 ,
so that E(ntk`)=stλ0
tk` = st exp(α1k + α2` + x0
tβ). The inclusion of u1t results in a generalized
Poisson model that relaxes the equality of the mean and the variance implied by the simple Poisson
model and allows overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).11 The random eﬀect also allows
correlation with the duration part of the model, as explained below.
Associated with each counted event (innovation) is a duration (regulatory delay). The durations
are assumed to follow a Weibull distribution with a hazard that depends on time-varying covariates
and unobserved heterogeneity terms. The notation threatens to become cumbersome at this point
9because the number of durations does not match the number of periods (instead it matches the sum
of all the counts) and because the durations may begin in one period and end in another. I term
a straddling duration to be one that begins in one period and ends in another. To construct the
likelihood of this part of the model, set aside the heterogeneity and the period-matching problem
for the moment and focus on time-varying covariates and straddling for a single duration.
Let y be the realization of the random duration variable Y> 0. Let vector Z(ς) be the value
at time ς of explanatory variables that are exogenous in the sense of Lancaster (1990, p.28), and
let Z(a,b) be the time-path of Z on [a,b]. The hazard rate of Y at time ς (conditional on Z(ς) and
a ﬁnite parameter vector θ)i s :
h(ς;θ,Z(ς)) ≡ lim
dς→0
Pr[ς ≤ Y< ς + dς|Y ≥ ς,θ,Z(ς,ς + dς)] (3)
(Lancaster, 1990). Note that only the contemporaneous value of Z enters h,n o ti t se n t i r ep a t h .I n
the present application the covariates are constant within each period t but may change between
periods; thus Z is a step function with jumps at the times corresponding to the calendar dates of
the beginnings of the periods. Label these points in [0,y], endpoints included, as (y0,y 1,...,y J),
and let hj(ς;θ) be the hazard rate in period j before the jth jump (set hJ equal to the hazard on
[yJ−1,y J]). A single straddling duration has pdf:










(see Peterson (1986)), where the dependence on θ is suppressed in the notation. Deﬁne the “com-
pleting spell” indicator dj,w h e r edj =1if duration y is observed completed after length yj and 0
if not. When duration y is observed in its entirety, then dj =0for all but the ﬁnal dJ+1. The ﬁnal
dJ will also be 0 if duration y is censored (e.g., ongoing regulatory delay spells at the end of the
observation period). Deﬁne





1−Fj(yj−1) if dj =0
fj(yj)
1−Fj(yj−1) if dj =1
(5)
10where Fj and fj represent the Weibull cumulative density function (cdf) and pdf, respectively,





gj(yj,y j−1,d j,Z(yj−1,y j)). (6)





































where the shape parameter σ (common to all periods and observations) and the rate parameter µj
are both positive. The Weibull mean is σΓ(σ)µj. The Weibull model allows duration dependence;
i.e., a nonautonomous hazard rate. Values of σ less than one (underdispersion) yield a hazard
rate that increases over the duration; this is known as positive duration dependence (the likelihood
of the spell ending in the next instant increases as time goes on). Values of σ g r e a t e rt h a no n e
(overdispersion) yield a decreasing hazard rate and negative duration dependence.






`∈L ntk` durations, where each straddling duration is counted only once. Let the
mth observation have Jm terms after splitting at the period changes, resulting in a split sample
((ymj)Jm
j=1)M




m=1 Jm, preserving the order of the series for the sake of the arguments of g in (5).
Similarly, relabel the associated completing spell indicators di, rate parameters µi, likelihood terms
gi, and explanatory variables zi (the appropriate levels of Z(ς)), i =1 ,...,N. Note that zi is a
vector of constants. To match the split durations to the periods associate each i with an index set
It so that {i|i ∈ It} are the indices pertaining to period t.
With the new notation we can introduce the heterogeneity. For i ∈ It, the rate parameter µi is
11modeled as
µi =e x p
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where γ1k and γ2` are ﬁrm and ﬁling type ﬁxed eﬀects as in the count model. Thus θ from (3) is
(γ,δ,σ). Parallel to the count model above, the random eﬀect u2t is common across ﬁrms, types,
and all split durations within a period; it is an unobserved heterogeneity term with variance τ2
2 ≥ 0.
Assume that E(eu2t)=1 . The inclusion of u2t results in a mixture model (Lancaster, 1990, ch.4)
that generalizes the standard Weibull model and allows correlation with the duration part of the
model.
Taken together, (u1t,u 2t) represent unobserved period-speciﬁc heterogeneity. To complete the
model and to specify the correlation between the counts and durations, let (u1t,u 2t) be deﬁned by





1 − ρ2η2t − τ2/2
¶
where (η1t,η2t) are iid draws from a bivariate standard normal distribution, τ1, τ2 ≥ 0, and
ρ ∈ [−1,1].T h e n(u1t,u 2t) are bivariate normal with variance (τ2
1,τ2
2) and correlation ρ.T h u sρ is
the key parameter governing correlation between the count and regulatory delay processes. If ρ is
positive, then departures from the means in the count and regulatory delay processes are positively
correlated, as might happen if there is “regulatory congestion” due to the ﬁnite resources of the
regulator (beyond that which may be captured by included covariates). If ρ is negative, then the
count and regulatory delay processes are negatively correlated, as might happen if the regulator
feels pressure to expedite service approvals when there are many new services created or if the
ﬁrm submits more new services to the regulator when approval times are short. The deﬁnition of
(u1t,u 2t) ensures that E(eu1t)=E(eu2t)=1 ,a sr e q u i r e da b o v e .
The joint pdf for the data in period t, {ntk`,y i|i ∈ It,k∈ K,` ∈ L}, conditional on {yi−1,u 1t,u 2t|i ∈















gi(yi,y i−1,d i,zi|ntk`,y i−1,u 2t)

, (10)
where the dependence on the parameters is suppressed in the notation. In the expression above,
the form of f(ntk`|u1t), the Poisson pdf, is given by (2). The form of gi, the contribution of split
duration i to the joint likelihood, is given by (5), (7), and (8). Note that gi is conditional on ntk`,
so that functions of current-period counts may be included in zi.12 Current period durations are
not allowed in xt (although functions of past durations are allowed).
Since (u1t,u 2t) are not observed, one ﬁnds the unconditional joint pdf by integrating out
(u1t,u 2t):
f({ntk`,y i})=Eu1t,u2tf({ntk`,y i}|u1t,u 2t) (11)





The expectation in (11) is a double integral that cannot be solved analytically, requiring numerical
methods.13 Estimation of this model therefore can be expensive when there are many covariates.
Although the general model (12) is rather complicated, it is about the simplest model that allows
correlation between the innovation and regulatory delay processes. The model contains several
familiar models as special cases. When ρ =0 , the count and duration models are independent
and may be estimated separately with full eﬃciency. Estimation of the independent models is
numerically easier than of the joint model because the integrals in (11) are unidimensional. When
τ1 =0 , the count model is the standard Poisson model with no accounting for overdispersion.
When τ1 > 0 the count model is the generalized Poisson model. When ρ =0 , these count models
are independent of the regulatory approval process, and (α,β) can be estimated consistently in
either model by MLE based on (2) with u1 identically equal to zero.14 Similarly, the duration
model when ρ =0(no correlation with the arrival process) may be estimated by MLE with the
13duration data. When τ2 =0 , the duration model is the standard homogeneous Weibull model.
When, in addition, σ =1 , the duration model is exponential. Estimating these restricted models
may be useful for hypothesis testing and to provide starting values for estimation of the full model.
5 Data and Estimation of the Model
Since the innovation and regulatory delay models are independent if ρ =0 ,Iﬁrst discuss each
separately in sections 5.1 and 5.2. In section 5.3 I discuss the results from joint estimation of the
fully correlated model.
5.1 The Innovation Model
5.1.1 Data
Data on all CEI plan ﬁlings and waiver requests from 1987 through 1997 were collected from the
FCC Record (see the Appendix). The CEI plans, plan amendments, and waivers provide a record
of new enhanced services that AT&T and the BOCs wished to introduce on an unseparated basis
during that time. Plans are the ﬁrm’s proposal to meet the CEI safeguards for a new information
service. Amendments are modiﬁcations to existing plans that are required when signiﬁcant new
functionality is added to a service. Waivers are requests for permission to oﬀer a new service
without meeting all of the required CEI safeguards, usually because of technological limitations.
During the interim around 1993 to 1995, when CEI plans were not required, there is no way to
track the introduction date of new services. However, after the Computer III remand, CEI plans
for all services introduced during the interim were ﬁled en masse, so one can count new services
in retrospect. After the interim, the BOCs again ﬁled CEI plans as new or amended services
were introduced. Since each enhanced service requires either a CEI plan or a waiver, this data set
encompasses all enhanced services oﬀered by AT&T and the BOCs.
To use the CEI plan ﬁlings as evidence of new service creation requires care. I deemed an
14amended plan to represent a new service only if it introduced new features or functionality and if
it was not mandated by the FCC.15 The new services are summarized in Table 2. In all, 74 new
enhanced services were introduced via CEI plans or waivers, and 27 were introduced during the
interim, for a total of 101 services during the observation period.
To apply the methodology developed in Section 4, I ﬁrst create the period-ﬁrm-type counts
(ntk`), where the periods are the quarters between the start of 1987 and the end of 1997 that at
least partially overlap with the “innovation observed” part of the timeline in Figure 1. The CEI
ﬁling types are plans, amendments, and waivers. Separating the ﬁlings by carrier and ﬁling type
this way allows the arrival process to diﬀer among groups through the ﬁxed eﬀects represented by
α in (1). For example, services represented by Ameritech’s CEI plans may be created at a diﬀerent
rate than services represented by PacBell’s CEI waivers. The ﬁxed eﬀects are estimated by two sets
of dummy variables; AT&T is the excluded carrier in the ﬁrm dummies and plans are the excluded
ﬁling type dummy. Because the observations come from two disjoint periods (before and after the
interim), I allow the mean of the duration process to diﬀer during the latter period by including a
dummy for the remand period (1995-1997).
5.1.2 Estimation and Prediction
The approach here is to ﬁt the model to the service innovation data from the periods when the
CEI regime was in place. Then, I can compare the model’s prediction for the number of services
introduced during the interim with the actual number of services introduced. If I ﬁnd that many
more services were introduced during the interim under the loosened regime than the model pre-
dicts, then the diﬀerence is evidence supporting the hypothesis that the lifting of the CEI regime
spurred the introduction of new services.
The results of the simple Poisson model (i.e., τ1 =0 ) estimation with only the ﬁrm, type, and
remand ﬁxed eﬀects are in Table 4, column one. Positive coeﬃcients increase the number of arrivals,
ceteris paribus.T h eB O Cﬁxed eﬀects are all negative, meaning that the BOCs introduced services
15at a relatively slower rate than AT&T (which matches the data in Table 2). The coeﬃcients for
amendments and waivers are also negative, implying that they were less frequent than plans. The
indicator for the remand period is not signiﬁcant, which indicates that the pace of innovation was
comparable in the two regulated periods.
Now that I have characterized the BOCs’ new service creation process under regulation, I
can use the ﬁtted model to answer the following question. If the lifting of structural separation
requirements had not occurred and the BOCs were required to continue to submit CEI plans for
new services, how many would I expect them to have submitted during the interim? If in fact the
reduced burden of regulation during the interim accelerated the introduction of new services, then
we should expect that my prediction will be signiﬁcantly lower than the actual number of services
introduced. This is indeed the case.
The predictor is based on the predicted yearly mean of the arrival process, ˆ λ
0
tk` from (1).16 To
calculate the predicted number of new services from the BOCs during the interim, calculate ˆ λ
0
tk`
using the estimated coeﬃcients, multiply by the length of the interim for ﬁrm k,a n ds u mo v e rk
and `.17 Note that the prediction for a BOC and plan type does not vary year to year in the ﬁxed
eﬀects model, because it includes no varying regressors. It is a feature of the homogeneous Poisson
model that such a predictor will reproduce the means in the raw data. What this version of the
model allows that the raw data do not is a way to estimate the prediction variance.
The results of the prediction for each ﬁrm are in Table 5; the resulting total prediction, pre-
diction interval, and p-value is in the ﬁrst row of Table 6.18 The third column of Table 5 has
the predicted number of new services we would have expected to see during the interim under the
counter-factual assumption that the CEI regime was still in place. The interim was between 1.5 and
2.6 years long, diﬀering for each ﬁrm because the FCC released them from the CEI requirements
on diﬀerent dates. If the structural separations requirements had not been lifted, we would expect
to have seen about 16.3 new plans and amendments introduced by the BOCs during the interim.
In fact, we saw 26, about 60% more than expected and outside the 95% prediction interval (see
16Table 6). The p-value of 26 services is 0.02; thus it is highly likely that the incentives to innovate
did change during the interim. The predictors from the other models I estimate in the next section
bolster this conclusion.
5.1.3 Speciﬁcation Checking
Before I put much weight on the conclusions from the prediction exercise, it is important to test
the baseline model for departures from the assumptions that it requires. Note that the nature
of the observation period already avoids one of the common pitfalls of applied regulation studies.
Typically, a change in regulation is a “one way street,” with a deregulated period generating
the second half of the observations. Many factors (such as competition) might lead to increased
innovation over time, and such “before-and-after” studies typically cannot separate the eﬀects of
the regulation from secular trends in innovation (Sappington and Weisman, 1996). Because the
interim occurs in the middle of my observation period, my study does not suﬀer from the same
diﬃculty.
In this section I perform speciﬁcation testing of several forms. Consider ﬁrst the possibility
that there is unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., that τ1 > 0) . T h es e c o n dc o l u m no fT a b l e4d i ﬀers
from the previous ﬁxed eﬀects estimation only in that τ1) is a free parameter. The coeﬃcient
estimates do not change much (as expected; even if there is heterogeneity the simple Poisson model
is consistent, although ineﬃcient). In this estimation (and in the following two generalized Poisson
estimations) τ1 diﬀers signiﬁcantly from zero.19 Given that there is evidence of heterogeneity,
I re-do the prediction exercise with the heterogeneous ﬁxed eﬀect model to make sure that the
prediction interval still excludes 26 services (the actual number introduced) after incorporating the
additional variance. The resulting prediction, prediction interval, and p-value is in the second row
of Table 6. Twenty-six services still has a low p-value (0.02), providing corroboration for the earlier
evidence that innovation changed during the interim.
Next consider the possibility that the mean is incorrectly speciﬁed through the omission of
17relevant variables. The ﬁrst variable to check is expected regulatory delay time. As noted in the
introduction, the long delays between innovation and introduction may be one reason that the
regulation hampered innovation. An expected regulatory delay variable was constructed based on
past realizations of regulatory delay (information that is common to all ﬁrms). The variable is
calculated assuming ﬁrms update their expectation of regulatory delay using Bayes’ rule as new
information from recent past experience is received.20 Expected regulatory delay is added to the
next two estimations: the congestion and economic variables estimations in Table 4. In both
estimations, the coeﬃcient on log expected delay is negative–longer expected delay leads to less
innovation. At sample averages, the elasticity of —0.33 in the congestion model implies that if
expected delay were to rise by 152 days, one fewer service would be added to the total yearly
innovation (all ﬁrms and plan types).21 The same calculation based on the economic variables
elasticity of —0.60 shows that there would be one fewer service created if expected delay rose by
only 83 days. Conversely, if regulatory delay were eliminated altogether, there would be from three
(congestion)t os i x( economic variables) new services per year. The congestion eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant only in the second estimation, so the conclusions here must remain tentative.
The next variables to check are economic and demographic variables that might aﬀect the
demand for new services. The economic variables estimation in Table 4 includes measures of
consumer income (log per-capita real income in the BOC’s territory) and BOC market size (log
number of access lines) (all variables not also in column one are demeaned). Since AT&T does
not have a territory like the BOCs, AT&T’s observations must be dropped for this estimation.22
These variables are not signiﬁcant,23 although access lines does have the expected sign (more lines
increases new services).
Next I check controls for the changing size of the population of potential new services. I include
the log of contemporaneous real R&D spending by the carriers and by the whole U.S. telecom-
munications industry. The estimated coeﬃcients in the economic variables model are statistically
insigniﬁcant.24 The coeﬃcient on ﬁrm R&D, 0.275, implies that (at sample averages) about $50M
18above average R&D spending would generate a new service.
Competition to the BOCs might also inﬂuence service creation, although the eﬀect could go
either way.25 The ﬁrst control for competition is the number of competitive access providers (CAPs)
in the ﬁrm’s territory.26 CAPs oﬀer access services to high-volume customers in urban areas, and
sometimes oﬀer information services as well. The other control is more general: the contribution of
the communications industry (net of the BOCs contribution) to real gross state product within the
BOC’s territory.27 This variable captures a broader range of competitive activity that the BOCs
face than does the CAP variable. The estimated coeﬃcients on both variables are negative, but
neither coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant.28
A linear time trend, to capture any other omitted variable that grows over time (such as
competitive pressure or the expected proﬁtability of introducing new services), is also insigniﬁcant.
Finally, a test of the joint hypothesis that all of the coeﬃcients in the economic variables estimation
that are not in the congestion estimation are zero fails to reject.29
Viewed as a whole, the evidence strongly indicates that omitted variables are not a problem for
the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, I re-do the prediction exercise based on the congestion
and economic variables models; the results are in rows three and four of Table 6. The predictors
are calculated using the actual values of the covariates during the interim period (and therefore
do not merely reproduce the sample mean of the dependent variable). Thus, if it is the covariates
alone that cause more innovation during the interim, it would be reﬂected in the prediction and
prediction interval. In fact, the covariates result in a smaller prediction than before. The resulting
p-values for 26 services are even lower than for the previous predictions: further evidence that
innovation changed during the interim.
One question remains: how sensitive are the predictions to the chosen parametric forms for
the hazard? Here I re-do the prediction exercise using coeﬃcient estimates from a Cox (1975)
semiparametric proportional hazards model, using the ﬁxed eﬀects regressors. The dependent
variable in this estimation is the interarrival times of innovation events. Flexibly modeling the
19interarrival process leads to a count distribution that can exhibit under- or overdispersion of any
form.30 The coeﬃcients are reported in the ﬁnal column of Table 4 (note that the intercept is
absorbed into the baseline hazard), and are close to the Poisson model. The prediction, based on
the Cox coeﬃcient estimates and a nonparametric estimate of the baseline hazard, is 15.0 plans and
amendments ﬁled during the interim, a bit lower than the prediction from the Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects
models.31 The prediction is lower because the nonparametric estimate of the baseline interarrival
hazard exhibits negative duration dependence, as opposed to the constant hazard imposed by the
Poisson assumption. The 26 services actually introduced by the BOCs still lie outside of the 95%
prediction interval (ﬁnal row of Table 6).32 The results from the Cox model corroborate the other
predictions: there is a very small chance that innovation did not change during the interim.
5.2 The Regulatory Delay Model
5.2.1 Data
Turn now to the regulatory delay submodel. The data set also contains the time to approval or
withdrawal for each CEI plan, amendment, or waiver request. Most observations end with approval
by the FCC, a few with withdrawal by the carrier.33 The approval delays were sizable: of the 68
spells ending in ﬁnal approval,34 the average was 204 days and the longest (AT&T SPECS waiver)
was 22 months. Of the 14 withdrawn plans and ongoing delays, the delay averages 241 days. The
longest ongoing delays (as of December 1997) are two CEI plans (Fast Packet and Internet Access)
Ameritech ﬁrst submitted in March 1995.35 Summary statistics of the data are in Table 7.
Other variables collected for each observation attempt to capture heterogeneity of services.
Such variables include ﬁrm and plan ﬁxed eﬀects, whether it is a “me-too” ﬁling,36 and whether
the plan was reﬁl e d .O n ee x p e c t st h a td e l a y sw i l lb el o n g e rt h em o r ec o m p l e xt h ei s s u e st h eC E I
plan raises. I proxy plan complexity by counting the number of pages in the FCC Record reporting
the approval, because the report includes a discussion of the issues. The number of competitors
20that are aﬀe c t e db yt h ep l a nm a ya l s oa ﬀect the time to approval; I count the number of interested
parties submitting comments for the public record.
5.2.2 Estimation and Speciﬁcation Checking
The simplest duration model, the exponential model (σ =1and τ2 =0 ; results not reported), is
rejected statistically in favor of the Weibull models. I therefore use Weibull models to interpret
coeﬃcients and calculate predicted delay. The results for the ﬁxed eﬀects Weibull model (τ2 =0 )
are in Table 8, column one. The parameter σ is estimated to be 0.613 and diﬀers signiﬁcantly from
unity, rejecting the exponential model.37 The data exhibit positive duration dependence, implying
that the longer the delay lasts, the more likely it is to end the next day (conditional on lasting as
long as it has). The positive duration dependence may have a structural origin. The FCC has a
legal obligation to act on ﬁlings in a timely matter, and the pressure may mount to approve ﬁlings
if they have been delayed a long time.
To interpret the coeﬃcients, recall from (9) that positive coeﬃcients increase mean delay.38
The estimates indicate that me-too status garners 41% shorter delays. Amendments are approved
9% quicker and waivers 16% slower than plans. Reﬁling a plan not surprisingly increases delay, by
48%. The average predicted mean duration is 226 days.
The heterogeneity parameter τ2 is allowed to vary in the second column of Table 8. The results
and likelihood from the generalized Weibull model diﬀer little from the standard Weibull model in
column one.
I also consider whether there is congestion in the regulatory approval process for CEI ﬁlings.
There is much variation in the number of plans awaiting regulatory approval over the observation
period. There are as many as 36 services stacked up in the “regulatory inbox” (shortly after the
remand period, when the services introduced during the interim were ﬁled en masse); see Figure
3. Does approval slow down when the regulatory system is backed up? It is of interest to separate
the impact of plans already sitting on the regulator’s desk when a new plan is ﬁled, versus the
21impact of plans ﬁled afterward.39 Two variables that are valid regressors in the model (refer to the
discussion of equation (10) concerning endogenous duration covariates) are the number of services
(from any ﬁrm) awaiting approval at the start of the spell and the number of new arrivals (from
any ﬁrm) during the length of the spell.40 I check for congestion by adding these two variables to
the hazard speciﬁcation.
The results of the congestion estimation are in Table 8, column three. Both congestion coeﬃ-
cients are negative, a surprising result, although only the number of new ﬁlings during the spell is
signiﬁcant. Neither eﬀect is large, however. The elasticity of regulatory delay with respect to new
ﬁlings is −0.29, implying that an extra ﬁling above average decreases the mean approval duration
by less than a week. If these results are not spurious,41 an interpretation may be as follows. When
services are stacked up in the regulatory inbox, the FCC relaxes its scrutiny of new plans a bit
and approves them marginally quicker. Holding that eﬀect constant, any ﬁlings arriving afterward
speed up approval of a plan already in the inbox, perhaps because regulatory resources need to be
shifted to the new arrivals.
Turning ﬁnally to the other covariates (the covariates estimation in Table 8),42 FCC Record
pages appears to be a weak proxy for plan complexity. The coeﬃcient is positive but not signiﬁcant.
The elasticity of 0.12 indicates that an extra page in the Record above the average of 6.4 increases
mean delay by 4 days. The number of commenters is marginally signiﬁcant; the elasticity of 0.046
indicates that an extra reply commenter above the average of 1.0 increases mean delay by only 1.2
days, indicating that opponents have limited power to slow down their rival’s plan approvals. The
predicted mean duration from this estimation is 214 days.
5.3 The Jointly Correlated Model
Turn now to the full model with unrestricted correlation allowed between the count and duration
models. The results from the unrestricted, joint ﬁxed eﬀects and congestion estimations are in
Table 9. In these estimations, unlike those reported in Tables 4 and 8, ρ is allowed to vary. In
22general, the coeﬃcients are close to those from the independent estimations.
In the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation the correlation between the count and duration models is negative,
as measured by ρ. Such negative correlation means that a shock leading to more innovation,
and therefore more tariﬀs submitted to the regulator, has the eﬀect of reducing regulatory delay
time. This indirect congestion eﬀect is similar to the direct congestion eﬀects in the independent
regulatory delay congestion estimation, where we included explicit covariates that elicited this
eﬀect. When these explicit covariates are omitted, as in the joint ﬁxed eﬀects estimation, then
the direct eﬀect shows up as negative unexplained correlation. Once the congestion variables are
explicitly included in the joint estimation (the second column of Table 9), the residual correlation
ρ turns positive. Thus, net of the direct congestion eﬀects in the model, there may be unobserved
factors that cause both increased innovation and longer delays.
Although ρ is signiﬁcant in both joint estimations, LR tests of each unrestricted estimation
against its restricted counterpart fail to reject the restricted models. Given this, and given the
added complexity that correlation adds to simulating the joint model, it appears best to rely on
the independent estimations for the comparison exercise in the next section.
6 The Costs of the CEI Regime
The predictions in section 5.1 have already provided evidence that innovation during the interim
was 60-99% higher than would have been the case had regulation still been in place. In this section
I include the impact of regulatory delay and ask a diﬀerent question. Now that I have estimated
the parameters for the entire model, I can compare the overall eﬀect on service introductions
(not just innovation) in the two periods. In Scenario 1, the interim period of lighter regulation
never happens, and the CEI regime is in place for the entire observation period (1987—1997). In
Scenario 2, the CEI regime never happens, and the interim conditions are in eﬀect for the entire
observation period. How many new services would one expect to have been introduced in each
23scenario? Comparing the two answers will measure the total eﬀect that the regulatory regime had
on innovation.
Scenario 1 employs the generalized Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects model for the arrival process (column
two of Table 4) and the Weibull ﬁxed eﬀects model for the delay process (column one of Table 8).
For Scenario 2, the projection is calculated by MLE of the simple Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects model using
the interim data. This model is the only one identiﬁed with the interim data (see note 5). The
Scenario 2 mean is 12.75 services created per year. Regulatory delay is zero for scenario 2. Table
10 shows that in Scenario 1, the BOCs introduce a projected 92 services. At the end of the period,
5.7 services are still awaiting regulatory approval.43 In Scenario 2, the BOCs introduce a projected
140 services. Thus in Scenario 2, the ﬁrms create 52% more services and are able to introduce 62%
more services than in Scenario 1. The average is 53.6 more services approved without the CEI
regulation, and the standard deviation is small enough to assure that the diﬀerence is positive with
high probability.44
In the steady state, the relevant comparison is between the innovation rates. As the observation
period in the projection exercise grows, the diﬀerence between innovation and introduction goes
away (in percentage terms). This is because (absent changes in covariates) the number of services
created is proportional to the length of the observation period, while the absolute diﬀerence between
innovation and introduction (services not approved in Table 10) is instead constant. In the context
of the queuing model, in the steady state the output rate of the regulatory approval process equals
the innovation rate.45 Nevertheless looking at introductions is interesting for two reasons. First,
in any ﬁnite amount of time there is a wedge between innovation and introduction caused by
regulatory delay. That wedge represents services that consumers could be enjoying but are not–
an opportunity cost of regulation. For example, AT&T proposed to oﬀer voice mail in the 1970’s
but was prevented by the FCC until after divestiture in 1984. Second, even in the steady state, if
regulatory delay suddenly dropped to zero consumers would see a many more new services oﬀered
to them as the regulatory queue empties out.
24Exercises comparing counterfactual scenarios are only as good as the assumptions upon which
they rest. Given the diﬃculties with such exercises, it is perhaps best to view this exercise as
illustrative rather than to place stress on the numerical results per se. The results from the
exercise illustrate the two ways that relaxed regulation beneﬁts consumers of telecommunications
services. First, many more new telecommunications information services were introduced when
the CEI regime was suspended. The evidence is strong that the onerous requirements of the
CEI regime prevented many services from being introduced. Second, suspending the CEI regime
removed the long approval delays for CEI plans, meaning that each new service became available to
consumers much sooner. Adding the CEI delay to the wait associated with tariﬃng any underlying
basic services pushes the time to introduction out even farther. The elimination of these long
introduction delays no doubt contributed to the BOCs’ decisions to introduce more services (as the
evidence from the innovation congestion estimation indicates).
7 Discussion and Conclusions
One would like to move beyond the mere counts and measure these increases in consumer welfare.
This is not possible with the present data, any more than it is with most of the literature on patent
counts. However, it is possible to do a “back of the envelope” calculation for voice messaging, one
of the CEI services introduced by all the BOCs. One recent study (Hausman, 1997) estimates the
consumer welfare gained from the introduction of voice mail by local telephone companies, ﬁnding
that the structural prohibition against enhanced services cost consumers about $1.2 billion per
year for voice messaging. Hausman’s methodology is not undisputed46 and I cannot extrapolate
from this ﬁgure to other services (voice mail is one of the most successful CEI services). However,
if the ﬁgure is valid, then at my model’s predicted regulatory approval delay of 213 to 276 days
(depending on which model in Table 8 is used) the CEI regime would have cost consumers an extra
$690 million to $910 million in lost welfare for voice mail alone.
25Even if the BOCs would have introduced 62% more services if the regime had not been in place,
I do not claim that welfare would have risen proportionally. Economic reasoning suggests that the
services introduced during the interim were probably not of comparable importance to the services
introduced under the CEI regime. The incremental services introduced during the interim–those
that would not have been introduced under the CEI regime–most likely created less revenue for
the BOCs since they were formerly deemed unproﬁtable to introduce. Accordingly, they were
probably worth less to consumers as well. There is no way to estimate this diﬀerence in worth with
the present data. I can, however, look at the types of plans that were ﬁled for services introduced
during the interim and compare them with those of the CEI regime. Of the 26 plans ﬁled for the
interim period, 12 of them (46%) were amendments of previously approved plans. Amendments
typically add new features to an existing service, and may be less beneﬁcial to consumers than
entirely new services. During the CEI regime, only 20% of ﬁlings are amendments. By this metric,
it appears that the BOCs may have introduced less-important services.
The analysis implicitly assumes that the services introduced are truly new; the welfare impact
of the regulation is blunted if they are not. For some of these services, consumers face substitutes
oﬀered by competitors. For example, Internet services oﬀered by BOCs are included in these data,
and consumers have many choices of Internet service providers. The case of Internet services is
the exception rather than the rule, however. In general, the CEI services introduced by BOCs are
not identical to any previously oﬀered by competitors. Because the CEI services are seamlessly
integrated with the BOCs networks, and therefore the subscriber’s local telephone service, these
services can oﬀer features that competitors previously could not. It is very likely that even if some
competitor already oﬀered a related service, the BOC’s oﬀering was highly diﬀerentiated. In fact,
one of the reasons the FCC instituted the CEI regime was because these services are unique, and
because competitors feared the BOCs would therefore have an unfair advantage.
A ﬁnal question concerns the nature of the experiment.
The estimation would stumble into the sequencing pitfall (identiﬁed by Sappington and Weis-
26man (1996)) if ﬁrms’ actions are spurred by anticipated changes in the regulatory regime. This
pitfall might apply to these data if, right before the ONA plans were approved, the BOCs held
oﬀ on introducing new services in anticipation of the upcoming reduced cost of so doing. On
the other end of the interim, the sequencing eﬀect would also imply that fewer services would be
introduced shortly after the regime was reinstated, if ﬁrms hurried services into the marketplace
just before the regime change. Three facts provide evidence against this pitfall. First, some BOCs
submitted CEI plans as shortly as a few weeks before and after the interim. Second, although
there are only three new services during the period from Computer III reinstatement to the ONA
plan approvals (see Figure 1), that number is well within the normal variation of the estimated
innovation process.47 Third, a dummy variable for the periods just before and after the interim in
the innovation regression is not signiﬁcant.
Against the demonstrated costs to consumers of the CEI regime, what was there to balance?
If regulators rationally and disinterestedly maximize social welfare, then they must have believed
that the beneﬁts of the CEI regime to consumers were large indeed. However, it appears that at
the time the CEI regulation was initiated, the FCC did not consider the opportunity cost of the
regulation: they compared the CEI regime to the previous structural separation regime (in which no
enhanced services were allowed at all) instead of to a regime with even less regulation. I emphasize
that this study is not a cost-beneﬁts analysis; without more data on competitors the beneﬁts are
impossible to evaluate. However, the beneﬁts of the regime appear to be slight: few requests for
i n t e r c o n n e c t i o nw e r ee v e rm a d eu n d e rt h eC E Ir e g i m e , 48 and competitors have shown little interest
in the CEI plans in recent years.49 The FCC intended the CEI regime to be a short-term solution
until the stricter ONA regime was fully in place. It took twelve years for the burdens of the CEI
regime to be signiﬁcantly reduced–a caution to those who would set up “temporary” regulation.
Of the three innovation-discouraging eﬀects mentioned in the introduction, the estimations
a r ea b l et oa d d r e s so n l yt h ee x p e c t e dr e g u l a t o r yd e l a ye ﬀect. Recall from section 5.1.3 that the
estimated impact of reducing expected regulatory delay to nil is 3 to 6 new services created per
27year. Given that the projection exercise in section 6 estimated the innovation diﬀerence between
the regulated and unregulated scenarios to be about 4.3 services per year, it appears that the
expected delay eﬀe c ta c c o u n t sf o rm u c ho ft h er e d u c t i o ni ni n n o v a t i o nu n d e rt h eC E Ir e g i m e .O n e
interesting extension to the present study would be to attempt to further disentangle these eﬀects.
As of February 1999, the BOCs are relieved from pre-ﬁling CEI plans, but are still required to
make the plans public. Therefore the eﬀect of information revelation still exists under the present
rules, while the eﬀect from the direct costs of preparing the plan is reduced50 and the eﬀect from
approval delay is eliminated. It will be interesting to see if the rule change spurs the creation of
new services.
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AC E I S e r v i c e s
This section contains the CEI plans, amended plans, and waiver requests used in the statistical
work.
Table 1: CEI Plans, Amendments, and Waivers
Date Included Included
Date Approved in Arrival in Delay
CEI Filing Filed or W/drawn Estimation Estimation
Ameritech
Interactive Audiotex Svcs 3/23/89 9/21/89 Yes Yes
Enh Protocol Processing Svcs 11/6/89 5/24/90 Yes Yes
Alarm Monitoring 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Fast Packet Data Svcs 3/13/95 ongoing3 Yes1 No2
Fax Store & Forward 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Interactive Voice Response Svcs 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Internet Access Svcs 3/13/95 ongoing3 Yes1 No2
Voice Mail Messaging 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Message Delivery Svc 6/11/95 12/15/95 Yes Yes
Personal Access Svc (PAS) 9/1/95 6/4/97 Yes Yes
Voice Mail Messaging (minor
amendment)
8/22/96 10/28/96 Yes Yes
Fax Store & Forward (amended) 9/27/96 12/4/96 Yes Yes
Reverse Search (waiver) 10/25/96 3/24/97 Yes Yes
Voice Mail Messaging (supplement to
minor amendment)
10/28/96 11/14/96 Yes Yes
Payphone Svc 11/27/96 4/15/97 No4 Yes
Electronic Vaulting Svc 2/27/97 12/31/97 Yes Yes
Bell Atlantic
Message Storage 3/6/87 2/18/88 Yes Yes
Message Storage (amended) 3/21/88 5/23/88 Yes Yes
Coin Messaging (waiver) 4/1/88 9/29/88 Yes Yes
Intellgate/Videotex Gateway 3/30/88 9/30/88 Yes Yes
Voice Messaging Svc 3/30/88 9/30/88 Yes Yes
Intellgate/Videotex Gateway
(amended)
10/11/88 1/30/89 Yes Yes
1Plan ﬁled after the remand to indicate a service had been introduced during the interim. Used only for calculation
of mean arrival rate for scenario 2 in Section 6.
2Plans ﬁled en masse after the interim are excluded from the delay analysis because the FCC approved them all
at the same time, indicating an exception to the usual approval process.
3As of end of 1997.
4Filing required by the FCC–does not reﬂect a new service.
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Date Included Included
Date Approved in Arrival in Delay
CEI Filing Filed or W/drawn Estimation Estimation
Protocol Processing Svcs 12/21/88 3/31/89 Yes Yes
Electronic Data Interchange Svcs 1/30/89 6/9/89 Yes Yes
Data Processings & Storage Svcs 6/6/89 12/13/89 Yes Yes
Radio-Based Enhanced Svcs 3/22/90 7/27/90 Yes Yes
Coin Messaging Delivery Svc (waiver) 2/12/91 6/4/91 Yes Yes
Enhanced Video Svcs 1/27/95 6/9/95 Yes Yes
Protocol Processing Svcs (amendment) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Internet Access Svc 3/8/96 6/6/96 Yes Yes
Payphone Svc 1/6/97 4/15/97 No4 Yes
Internet Access Svc (amendment) 5/5/97 ongoing3 Yes Yes
Intranet Management Svc 10/3/97 ongoing3 Yes Yes
BellSouth
Voice Messaging Svc 3/18/88 8/31/88 Yes Yes
VMS (amended) 8/31/88 12/23/88 Yes Yes
Coin Messaging (waiver) 10/7/88 2/15/89 Yes Yes
Synchronous Protocol Processing Svcs 8/19/88 2/15/89 Yes Yes
Gateway Svcs (amended) 11/2/88 3/30/89 Yes Yes
Gateway Svcs (further amendment) 3/30/89 5/25/89 Yes Yes
Synchronous Protocol Processing Svcs
(amendment)
5/24/89 9/14/89 Yes Yes
Account Code Billing (waiver) 3/7/91 5/27/92 Yes Yes
Voice Messaging Svcs (amended) 6/1/93 7/14/93 Yes Yes
Gateway Svcs (amended) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Synchronous Protocol Processing Svcs
(amendment)
3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Reverse Search (waiver) 3/1/96 7/3/96 Yes Yes
Payphone Svc 11/22/96 4/15/97 No4 Yes
Gateway Svcs and Synchronous Proto-
col Processing Svcs (amended) & wvr5
8/26/97 ongoing3 Yes Yes
NYNEX
Info-Look/Videotex Gateway (waiver) 5/11/88 10/5/88 Yes Yes
Voice Messaging Svc 6/21/88 1/12/89 Yes Yes
Protocol Processing Svcs 5/17/89 1/4/90 Yes Yes
Electronic Info Svcs. 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Voice Messaging Svcs (amended) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Audiotext Info Srvcs 7/28/95 1/23/96 Yes Yes
Custom Announcement Svcs 7/28/95 1/23/96 Yes Yes
Remote Data Processing Svcs 7/28/95 1/23/96 Yes Yes
Payphone Svc 1/3/97 4/15/97 No4 Yes
PaciﬁcB e l l
5These were ﬁled as two CEI plans; they are counted as one because the plans were ﬁled to indicate that tech-
nologies converged.
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Date Included Included
Date Approved in Arrival in Delay
CEI Filing Filed or W/drawn Estimation Estimation
Voice Mail Svc 7/2/87 2/18/88 Yes Yes
Voice Mail Svc (amended) 3/21/88 5/23/88 Yes Yes
Electronic Messaging Svcs 6/20/88 2/21/89 Yes Yes
Videotex Gateway svc 9/23/88 4/7/89 Yes Yes
Voice Store & Forward Svc 11/18/88 5/22/89 Yes Yes
Protocol Conversion Svcs 3/19/90 10/25/90 Yes Yes
Protocol Conversion Svcs (amended) 3/19/92 5/21/93 Yes Yes
Voice Messaging Svcs (amended) 5/1/92 5/29/92 Yes Yes
Electronic Messaging Svcs (amended) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Enhanced Protocol, Code, and Format
Conv. Svc
3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Fax Store and Forward 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
VMS (amended) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Voice Store & Forward (amended) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Payphone Svc 12/26/96 4/15/97 No4 Yes
SWBT
Voice Messaging Svcs 4/1/88 9/29/88 Yes Yes
Gateway (waiver) 8/24/88 1/30/89 Yes Yes
Protocol Conversion Svcs 12/31/88 3/9/89 Yes Yes
Voice Messaging Svcs (amended) 4/17/90 7/23/90 Yes Yes
Payment Processing Svcs 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Protocol Conversion Svcs (Amendment) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Voice Messaging Svcs (amended) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Fax Svc 8/3/95 5/7/96 Yes Yes
Internet Access Svc 8/3/95 1/11/96 Yes Yes
Fax Svc (minor amendment) 5/7/96 6/11/96 Yes Yes
PC Backup & Recovery 8/3/95 6/11/96 Yes Yes
Reverse Search (waiver) 1/16/96 7/1/96 Yes Yes
Basic Payphone 12/30/96 4/15/97 No4 Yes
Interactive Call Manager 8/15/96 5/8/97 Yes Yes
Security Svc 4/4/96 5/16/97 Yes Yes
Internet Support Svcs 6/21/96 ongoing3 Yes Yes
Payphone (minor amendment) 7/11/97 ongoing3 Yes Yes
USW e s t
Voice Messaging Svcs 5/13/88 1/13/89 Yes Yes
Protocol Processing Svcs 2/24/89 7/13/89 Yes Yes
Voice Store & Forward 10/24/89 6/6/90 Yes Yes
Fax Store & Forward 12/15/89 6/6/90 Yes Yes
Audiotex 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Enhanced Fax Svcs 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Electronic Messaging Svcs 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
On-Line DB access 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Protocol Processing Svcs (amended) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
31Table 1: CEI Plans, Amendments, and Waivers
Date Included Included
Date Approved in Arrival in Delay
CEI Filing Filed or W/drawn Estimation Estimation
Voice Messaging Svcs (amended) 3/13/95 10/31/95 Yes1 No2
Reverse Search (waiver) 4/4/94 11/6/95 Yes Yes
Voice Messaging Svcs (amended) 9/13/96 ongoing3 Yes Yes
Payphone 1/6/97 4/15/97 No4 Yes
AT&T6
Subaccount Billing Svcs (waiver) 6/10/87 8/19/87 Yes Yes
Transaction Svcs 10/26/87 5/11/88 Yes Yes
CODEC conversion 12/18/87 7/29/88 Yes Yes
FTS 2000 1/24/89 6/15/89 Yes Yes
Enhanced Svcs complex 3/30/89 9/13/89 Yes Yes
DIAL IT 900 Svc Call Count Arrange-
ments (waiver)
8/18/89 10/6/89 Yes Yes
Enhanced Packet Svcs 6/23/89 2/2/90 Yes Yes
Transaction Svcs (amended) 6/7/90 12/18/90 Yes Yes
ESC (amended) 2/13/91 8/8/91 Yes Yes
SPECS Enh. Svcs (waiver) 10/31/91 8/27/93 Yes Yes
B Details of the Projection Exercise in Section 6
This supplement contains further details on the calculations underlying the predictions in The
Costs of the CEI Regime section, and will be made available upon request to interested readers
(as indicated in a footnote in the paper). The innovation (count) model and the regulatory delay
(selection and duration) models compose a G/G/∞ queuing system7 (Prieger (1999) explicates
this equivalence in detail). To know how many services are introduced to consumers, one needs
to calculate what the output of the queuing system is given the estimated parameters. When
innovation (arrivals, in the parlance of queuing theory) follows a homogeneous Poisson process, an
existing result from queuing theory provides this answer. I ﬁrst present this result, and then show
6After 1991, the FCC treated enhanced services from AT&T diﬀerently than those from the BOCs. To preserve
comparability, new servies by AT&T after 1991 are not included in the data set.
7G is a catch-all symbol for a general distribution. The notation means the arrivals and processing time follow an
unspeciﬁed distribution, and that there are an inﬁnite number of processors (i.e., in this model the services awaiting
regulatory approval do not queue up).
32h o wi tm u s tb em o d i ﬁed for the present model, in which innovation is inhomogeneous and contains
random eﬀects. All results in this section are for the independent model (ρ =0 ).
To ﬁnd the output process of a homogeneous Poisson arrival (M/G/∞; M for Markovian)
queue, let λ be the rate parameter for the Poisson arrival stochastic process and let G be the CDF
of the delay time process. Then the output process of a M/G/∞ queue is a non-homogeneous
Poisson stochastic process with intensity κ(t)=λG(t) (Ross, 1983, p.39). The number of events





(Do not confuse this τ with τ1 and τ2 from the innovation and regulatory delay model in section
4 of the paper.)
Recall that in my model innovation is inhomogenous: the rate λtk` = eu1t exp(α1k + α2` + x0
tβ)
changes each period due to the covariates and the random eﬀect u1t. The number of arrivals
in a year (conditional on u1t) follow a Poisson distribution with mean λtk`. The inhomogeneity
o fi n n o v a t i o nm e a n st h a t( 1 3 )m u s tb em o d i ﬁed for the model in the paper. First, note that
conditional on {u1t}T
t=1, each period is, in isolation, a simple M/G/∞ queue (i.e., conditional on
u1t the arrival process is Poisson and the arrival rate is constant within the period). Let τ be the
time of the end of the observation period. Then the question is what is the contribution of the
M/G/∞ queue in period t to the number of exits from the system at time τ? Once this answer
is known (conditional on u1t), the total number of exits at time τ will be found as the sum of
the contributions from each previous period. To ﬁnd an answer unconditional on {u1t} will then
require integrating out {u1t}.
To ﬁnd the contribution of period t to the number of exits from the system at time τ,d e ﬁne
st to be the length of period t and ςt to be the length of time between the end of period t and τ.
During period t, some arrivals during that period will exit during that period, and some will exit
at a later time. Denote the number of arrivals during period t as nt, the number of current-period
33arrivals that exit during the period as kt, the number of current-period arrivals left in the system
at the end of the period as mt ≡ nt − kt, and the number of mt that exit before time τ as lt
(drop the k` subscripts for now, for notational simplicity). We are interested in the mean and
variance of kt +lt,w h i c hc a nb ef o u n db yﬁrst conditioning on {u1t} and then unconditionally. At
this point we need some more notation. Let Qt(u1t) ≡ kt + lt|u1t, Qm
t (u1t) ≡ Ekt,lt (Qt(u1t)),a n d
Qv
t(u1t)=Va r kt,lt(Qt(u1t)).









where G is the cdf of the duration process that describes regulatory delay (recall that u1t is
embedded in λt). Note that G is the same for all t.






G(ςt)l [1 − G(ςt)]
mt−l . (15)
This expression follows from standard probability arguments (Ross, 1983, p.39): with probability
G(ςt) an arrival exits by time ςt and with probability 1 − G(ςt) an arrival does not exit by time
ςt; these events are independent, and the binomial coeﬃcient term reﬂects all the combinations
of possible events. The unconditional probability that lt = l depends on the distribution of mt.
Deﬁne Λt ≡ λt [st −
R st
0 G(s)ds];t h e nmt|u1t ∼ Poisson(mean= Λt) (Ross, 1983, 38—39). Then the













=e x p ( ΛtG(ςt))[ΛtG(ςt)]
l /l! (17)
from which it is clear that
lt|u1t ∼ Poisson(mean = ΛtG(ςt)) (18)
Putting the pieces together, from (14) and (18) we have
























(recall that the Poisson variance equals the mean), where now the subscripts k (for ﬁrms) and `







`∈L ktk` + ltk` be the total number of exits from the system at time τ.
Deﬁne Qm ≡ E (Q) and Qv = Va r(Q).S i n c et h e{u1t} are mutually independent and E(λtk`)=
λ0
tk` =e x p( α1k + α2` + x0










α1k + α2` + x0
tβ
¢µ














the simple number of arrivals over the observation period. The second term in parentheses in (22)
is bounded between 0 and 1, and is an adjustment factor to reﬂect that not all arrivals will have
exited the system by the end of the observation period when there is regulatory delay.
Furthermore, independence of the {u1t} and the formula for the relationship between marginal
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is the variance of the lognormal exp(u1t).
35Now all that remains is the ﬁnd an expression for G.W h e n G i st h ec d fo ft h eW e i b u l l
distribution (as in the ﬁxed eﬀects Weibull model in the ﬁrst column of Table 8, used for Scenario
1), the integral appearing in (22) and (24) must be calculated numerically. Conditional on rate µi,
the Weibull cdf is given by equation (8) in the paper. This is the function denoted G(τ) above.
For the Scenario 1 prediction from The Costs of the CEI Regime section of the paper (the CEI
regime for all of the observation period), I set τ =( 1 1years) and evaluate Qm from (22) with this
value of τ and the estimates (ˆ α, ˆ β, ˆ γ, ˆ σ) from the Generalized Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects estimation in
Table 4 of the paper. The calculation uses the BOCs only (not AT&T), given that AT&T’s data
are only partially observed: K = {2,...,8}. The remand period indicator variable, the only xt in
this model, is set to 0 for all periods except those from 1995-1997. Evaluating the integrals in Qm
required numerical integration in Fortran (note that there are 924 integrals to be calculated: 44
quarters×7 ﬁrms×3 plan types). For Scenario 2 (no CEI regulation during the observation period),
the only model that is identiﬁed is a homogeneous Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects model, because the only
data available from the interim are nk`, the total counts from the interim for each ﬁrm and plan
type. Formulae (22) and (24) also hold for this model if τ1 is set to zero and Gk` =1(i.e., no
regulatory delay).
The values of Qm for the two scenarios are reported in Table 9 as Projected Services Introduced.
The standard deviation reported in the table is the square root of Qv from (24). Note that Qv
accounts only for variation from {kt,l t,u 1t}, not from estimation error in (ˆ α, ˆ β, ˆ γ, ˆ σ,ˆ τ1).N o t e
further that since Q is not Normally distributed, the usual conﬁdence interval based on Qv will not
have the usual coverage probability. However, the Poisson distribution is well-approximated by the
Normal distribution when the mean is large. Therefore, if Qm is relatively large compared to the





Qv] will have approximately 95% coverage probability.
The conﬁdence interval for the Diﬀerence column in the same table is even more complicated.
Even without the u1t,t h eDiﬀerence random variable is a diﬀerence of two Poisson random vari-
36ables, the distribution of which has no closed form expression (Johnson, Kotz and Kemp, 1993,
pp.191—192). Again, however, if the mean diﬀerence is relatively large compared to the variance
of u1t,t h ec o n ﬁdence interval based on the usual pivots will have approximately correct coverage
probability.
C Calculating Expected Regulatory Delay
The congestion estimations include a measure of expected regulatory delay. Here I explain the
construction of this variable. A few features that should be part of such a variable are:
• Expected delay should be conditional on information available to the ﬁrms, which is constantly
changing.
• Information on ongoing as well as completed delays should be incorporated into the expec-
tation.
• Expected delay should be updated in some systematic fashion as new information arrives.
• More recently revealed information should be given more weight than old information, since
regulatory behavior may evolve over time.
My expected regulatory delay variable has all these features. Begin by assuming that ﬁrms
hold a common belief that regulatory delays are iid draws from a distribution fY (y). Assume
further that ﬁrms believe fY is the exponential distribution with rate λ, so that a random sample







where di is an indicator that is 1 if the spell is completely observed and 0 if ongoing. Given λ,t h e
expected mean delay for an uncensored spell is 1/λ.T h e ﬁrms all hold the common prior belief
37that the rate parameter λ has prior distribution
π(λ)=µ2λexp(−λµ). (26)
This prior is a Gamma distribution with shape parameter α =2(this distribution is also known as
an Erlang distribution). I emphasize that these beliefs are simple for the purpose of tractability.
This distribution (Gamma) is the conjugate prior for the exponential distribution, and so admits
simple analytical results.
B a s e do nt h ei n f o r m a t i o nr e v e a l e dt h r o u g hy,t h eﬁrms update their belief about the distribution
















also Gamma distributed, where N1 is the number of completed durations (N1 =
PN
i=1 di)a n d˜ Y is
the sum of the durations, completed or not (˜ Y =
PN
i=1 yi).







µ + ˜ Y
N1
(28)
Two questions remain: how do we choose µ, and how can we incorporate the fourth bullet
point above? First, on µ, the parameter in the prior distribution (26). One can calculate the prior
expected delay to be
R ∞
0 λ−1π(λ)dλ = µ.T h u sµ is the initial belief about regulatory delay before
any actual delays are revealed. In the spirit of rational expectations I assume that the ﬁrms have
correct expectations at the beginning and set µ equal to the average delay that is seen over the
ﬁrst two years of data. The inﬂuence of the initial assumption dies out fairly quickly over time.
Second, consider ways to weight more recent information more than old information. Note that
expected regulatory delay (28) is an average of µ and the revealed information ˜ Y , and that all
observations composing ˜ Y are weighted equally. I do the following instead. The value of xed in a
given period t is calculated from (28) where only the observed yi from the last four periods (i.e.,
38periods t − 4, t − 3, t − 2,a n dt − 1) are included in ˜ Y . These are the past years’ worth of data.
No information from period t is included, because if ρ 6=0in the model from section 4 then that
would make xed an endogenous covariate. For the initial ﬁve periods, µ in the formula is chosen
as described above. After that time, µ instead is taken to be the value of xed from four periods
ago. Since this µ, which incorporates information about all past yi receives as much weight in (28)
as any one of the yi from the last four periods, it ensures that old information is downweighted






















for t ≥ 5 (31)
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43NOTES
1The Bell Operating Companies are Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, PaciﬁcB e l l ,
Southwestern Bell Telephone, and US West. In most of the study period, these ﬁrms were inde-
pendent. Bell Atlantic merged with NYNEX in 1996 and Southwestern Bell merged with Paciﬁc
Bell in 1997; the ﬁrms continued to issue separate CEI plans.
2BellSouth Comments in the Computer III Further Remand Proceedings, CC Dkt No. 95-20 (1998).
3MCI contested Ameritech’s CEI plan for Personal Access Service while it added the functionality
described in the plan to its competing service. Eventually Ameritech withdrew its plan [FCC
Report and Order (1999, footnote 66)].
4See Braeutigam (1979) for a model incorporating the ﬁrst and third eﬀects.
5Counts within each category of services are suﬃcient statistics in a Poisson model that includes
only categorical ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, without knowing the calendar dates of each service only the
Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects model presented below is identiﬁed, not any of the other innovation models).
6Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 948 (1986) et al. See Prieger (1999) for the other legal
citations for this section.
7This section draws from Brock (1994, ch.12) and Vogelsang and Mitchell (1997, ch.6). The FCC
eventually relieved AT&T of most Computer III and ONA requirements.
8Services were submitted as early as the ﬁrst quarter of 1987. Gateway services are transmission-
based (but not content-based) information services. Content-based services were allowed after July
25, 1991.
9An early version of this study was submitted on behalf of Ameritech in the regulatory review
proceedings leading up to the February 1999 decision. See Prieger (1998) for the study and FCC
Report and Order ( 1 9 9 9 )f o rd i s c u s s i o no fi ti nt h eF C C ’ sd e c i s i o n .
4410Queuing theory, developed by engineers and operations researchers, has been applied to economic
phenomena by Daniel (1995) and Mulligan and Hoﬀman (1998).
11In particular, if st =1 , mtk` ≡ exp(α1k + α2l + x0
tβ),a n dδ ≡ exp(τ2
1),t h e nE(ntk`)=mt and
Va r(ntk`)=mt [1 + mt(δ − 1)] (Anscombe, 1950).
12Strictly speaking, if ρ 6=0then ntk` is endogenous and gi is not the true contribution to the joint
likelihood if functions of ntk` appear as regressors. However, even when a time-varying covariate
such as ntk` is not exogenous, the expression in (6), and therefore (10), is a partial likelihood
(Lancaster, 1990, sec.9.2.11). Because estimates resulting from maximizing a partial likelihood
behave exactly as do ML estimates, including consistency of the parameter and s.e. estimates
(Lancaster, 1990, sec.9.2.2), I will not further emphasize this distinction.
13I use Gaussian quadrature, with 50 evaluation points in both dimensions. See Quandt (1983,
section 8.2) for a brief introduction to (and further references for) quadrature.
14Even when τ1 > 0, MLE based on a simple Poisson model yields consistent estimates of (α,β) as
long as the conditional mean is correctly speciﬁed (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, sec. 3.2.3).
15At times the FCC requires a BOC to submit a new CEI plan to address concerns it has. There is
typically nothing new about the telecommunications service itself in such amendments. Similarly,
if a plan was ﬁled because functionality of a service was reduced, this was not counted as a new
service. Finally, if two new plans were submitted because two previously distinct technologies had
converged, only one of the new plans was counted. See the Appendix to see to which ﬁlings these
remarks apply.
16One change is made to the models in Table 4 when forming the predictions. Since the interim
period is neither in the initial Computer III period nor in the subsequent remand period, I do not
include the remand indicator in the estimations for any of the predictions. Thus the predictions
reﬂect the average arrival rate in the two CEI periods. Given that the remand coeﬃcient is small
in these models, this averaging has little impact on the predictions.
4517Only plans and amendments were used in the prediction exercise, both for the prediction and the
actual number of service introduced. Waivers were observable during the interim and do not need
to be predicted. US West did in fact ﬁl eaw a i v e rd u r i n gt h ei n t e r i m .Ia l s od on o ti n c l u d eA T & T
in the prediction exercise because the ﬁrm’s data ends after 1991.
18The prediction interval accounts for variation from two sources: estimation error and the intrinsic
variation of the Poisson random variable. The bootstrap prediction interval (adapted from Stine
(1985)) covers 95% of a sample of size 9,999 of y∗ + ²i, where y∗ is the prediction and ²i = yi − y∗
i
is the prediction error. The yi are pseudo-random deviates drawn from a Poisson distribution with
mean y∗.T h ey∗
i are bootstrapped predictions.
19ˆ τ1 is half-normal under the hypothesis that τ1 =0 ,a n ds ot h ec o r r e c tp- v a l u ei sb a s e do na
one-sided critical value.
20The variable measuring expected regulatory delay is constructed assuming the ﬁrms believe regu-
latory delay is exponentially distributed (with rate κ). The expectation is updated via Bayes’ rule
given observed completed and ongoing delays within the past year. The prior distribution for κ is
taken to be Gamma, the conjugate prior. See the appendix for details.
21The yearly mean of the arrival process is λ0
tk`; the elasticity of the mean with respect to x is βx.
When x = log(w), then the elasticity of the mean with respect to w is β.
22I also drop the BOC ﬁxed eﬀects because they are highly correlated with the added covariates.
The ﬁxed eﬀects capture most of the heterogeneity among BOCs, leaving little variation for the
other covariates to explain.
23A Wald test statistic for the two variables is at the 0.70 quantile of a χ2(2) distribution. When
population is added, it is also insigniﬁcant.
24The ﬁrm R&D ﬁgures are from the annual FCC Statistics of Communications Common Carriers.
Industry ﬁgures are from National Science Foundation survey data for U.S. ﬁrms in the commu-
46nications equipment and electrical components categories. Both are in $millions, adjusted by the
GDP deﬂator. A Wald test statistic with joint null hypothesis that each coeﬃcient is 0 is at the
0.88 quantile of a χ2(2) distribution.
25The replacement eﬀect (Arrow, 1962) indicates that a monopolist that innovates merely replaces
one stream of rents with another, so that the incremental proﬁt from innovation is not as great
as for a competitive ﬁrm. The eﬃciency eﬀect (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) indicates that a new
service is worth more to a monopolist than to an entrant who then gains only duopoly proﬁt.
Which eﬀect predominates is an empirical matter.
26Data are from the FCC Fiber Reports (Kraushaar, 1991—1997) and NPRG (1997).
27The variable was constructed by subtracting the BOC’s contribution to GSP within its region from
the total. The BOC’s contribution was estimated as (operating revenue — [operating expenses not
including depreciation]) using FCC SOCC data. This approximates the BEA (1985) methodology
for calculating gross product.
28A Wald test statistic with joint null hypothesis that each coeﬃcient is 0 is at the 0.31 quantile of
a χ2(2) distribution.
29A Wald test statistic is at the 0.51 quantile of a χ2(7) distribution.
30Winkelman (1995) and Gourieroux and Visser (1997) also model count processes with interarrival
times. I am not aware of any empirical studies using interarrival times for count data apart from
Prieger (1999).
31The Cox model uses a partial likelihood method to estimate the eﬀect of regressors on an unspec-
iﬁed baseline hazard. I estimate the baseline hazard via Breslow’s (1974) nonparametric method.
The prediction is the sum of (interim lengthi/mean survival timei)f o re a c hﬁrm-plan type. This
predictor is the asymptotic mean of the compound counting process generated from the renewal
processes associated with the estimated survival functions. The prediction may be biased upward
47due to censoring.
32The bootstrap prediction interval covers 95% of a sample of y∗ +²i,w h e r ey∗ is the prediction and
²i = yi − y∗
i is the prediction error. The yi are pseudo-random deviates (1,000,000 draws) drawn
from a compound counting process where the interarrival times are drawn from the Cox/Breslow
estimated survival curves. The y∗
i were generated by drawing pseudo-random deviates from the
estimated asymptotic distribution of the mean interarrival time and forming the corresponding
counts.
33In no case does the FCC reject a CEI ﬁling outright. Instead, the FCC notiﬁes the carrier of that to
w h i c hi to b j e c t s ,a n dt h ec a r r i e rm o d i ﬁes and resubmits the plan. In such cases the approval delay
is calculated from the submission of the ﬁrst plan to the ﬁnal approval of the last plan. Withdrawn
plans are counted as censored observations.
34In the approval delay analysis I exclude the February 1995 en masse ﬁling for the services from the
interim. The FCC approved them all at the same time (except for two from Ameritech), indicating
an exception to the usual approval process.
35These two services have not been approved because of a disagreement between the FCC and the
company concerning the classiﬁcation of an underlying service as basic or enhanced.
36A me-too ﬁling is a CEI plan that is substantially similar to a previously approved plan ﬁled by
another carrier. The FCC rules expedite approval for such plans.
37Both a t-test (statistic is at the 1.0−3E-10 quantile) and an LR test (statistic is at the 1.0−1E-6
quantile) with H0: σ =1and HA: σ 6=1reject the exponential model.
38The mean of a Weibull-distributed duration is σΓ(σ)µi. When the variables are in logs, the co-
eﬃcients are elasticities. The percentage change due to an indicator z with coeﬃcient δ taking a
value of 1 is %∆ = exp(δ) − 1.
39More physical measures of regulatory capacity–FCC total and CEI-related personnel–have little
48variation in the observation period and are not signiﬁcant when added to the estimations.
40These are both treated as time-varying covariates, as explained in section 4. The former is calcu-





`∈L ntk` for the period of the split duration.
41Figure 3 suggests two reasons the result might be spurious. First, there are a large number of
services in process during 1995 due to the en masse ﬁling after the remand, which may have
undue inﬂuence. However, dummying out this period barely changes the coeﬃcients on the two
congestion variables. Second, during the remand period (after 1995), there are generally more
services in process. Again, dummying the remand period hardly changes the coeﬃcients.
42There is a sample selection issue with the covariates estimation. FCC Record pages and the number
of commenters are available only for observations that appear in the Record. This necessarily
excludes all plans that were withdrawn by the carriers and those for which approval had not yet
been granted by the end of the observation period (14 observations). These observations may not be
a random subsample because plans with the longest expected delay are most likely to be withdrawn
or censored. This may account for the shorter predicted mean from the covariates estimation. The
impact of sample selection bias is not likely to be severe; none of the coeﬃcients included in both
the congestion and the covariates estimations changes sign.
43Finding the services introduced requires a result from queuing theory. If arrivals are Poisson
with rate λ and the CDF of the delays is G, then the services introduced (i.e., the output of
the inﬁnite server queuing system) at time t is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with mean
Λ(t)=λ
R t
0 G(s)ds (Ross, 1983, p.39). The actual formula used is a modiﬁcation of this result
reﬂecting two extensions: the arrival process in Scenario 1 is generalized Poisson, and the arrival
rate varies over the observation period because of the heterogeneity and the remand indicator.
Details of the calculations in this section are in an appendix.
44The standard deviations in the table account for intrinsic (not estimation) variation. The dis-
49tributions of the projected services introduced random variables are not Gaussian, but the usual
conﬁdence interval based on twice the s.d. will have approximately correct coverage.
45This is a property of any ergodic inﬁnite server queuing system.
46See comments by Pakes (1997); see also Bresnahan (1997) for comments on another application of
the same econometric methodology.
47Three is the 0.13 quantile of a Poisson distribution with mean 6.3, the estimated mean for that
time period from the ﬁxed eﬀects model ; no reasonably sized test would reject the hypothesis that
the mean of the arrival process was constant during that time.
48Vogelsang and Mitchell (1997), ch.6; GTE (1998) comments in the Computer III Further Remand
Proceedings also state that the number of requests for interconnection was “modest.”
49FCC, Computer III Further Remand Proceedings FNPRM (January 29, 1998) at 64.
50Without the possibility of the FCC requiring changes to the CEI plan before the service is available,
the ﬁrm’s expected costs of plan preparation drops.
50Structural Remand–
Initial Separation Lifted Back to CEI
CEI Regime (1992/3— Regime
Carrier (1987—1992/3) Jan 1995) (1995—1997) Total
Ameritech 2 6 6 14
Bell Atlantic 11 1 4 16
BellSouth 7 2 2 11
NYNEX 3 2 3 8
PacBell 8 6 0 14
SWBT 4 3 8 15
USW e s t 4 7 † 11 2
AT&T∗ 11 — — 11
Total 50 27 24 ‡ 101
∗ After 1991, the FCC treated enhanced services from AT&T diﬀerently than those from the BOCs. To
preserve comparability, new services by AT&T after 1991 are not included in the data set.
† Includes a waiver ﬁled during the interim.
‡ Excludes an FCC-mandated payphone plan for each BOC in 1997. The services were not new.
Table 2: New Telecommunications Information Services Introduced Through CEI Plans,
Amendments, and Waivers
51Obser- First Third
vations Min. Quartile Median Mean Quartile Max.
784 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 3.04
Table notes: units of observation are ntk`, the number of new CEI ﬁlings from a given ﬁrm and of a
given type (ﬁlings, amendments, waivers) per quarter. When less than the entire quarter is observed,
the count is extrapolated to the entire quarter for purposes of these statistics.
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Figure 1: Time Line for the Comparably Eﬃcient Interconnection Regime
52Poisson Model Generalized Poisson Model Cox Model
Fixed Fixed Economic Fixed
Eﬀects Eﬀects Congestion Variables Eﬀects
intercept 0.494 0.461 0.371 −1.209
∗∗














(0.339) (0.340) (0.351) (0.380) (0.367)
remand period −0.067 −0.061 0.072 2.607
∗ −0.529
∗
(1995-1997) (0.270) (0.299) (0.361) (1.358) (0.285)
expected regulatory −0.331 −0.601
∗
delay (0.287) (0.337)

















(0.483) (0.476) (0.492) (0.507)
Bell Atlantic −0.173 −0.157 −0.139 −0.262
















(0.478) (0.487) (0.496) (0.507)
SWBT −0.444 −0.421 −0.401 −0.287






(0.536) (0.577) (0.552) (0.534)




parameter) (ﬁxed) (0.192) (0.193) (0.203)
log likelihood −236.26 −235.51 −230.91 −199.63
observations 784 784 784 726 137
* = 10% level signiﬁcance; ** = 5% level signiﬁcance; *** = 1% level signiﬁcance; stars for τ1 based on one-sided test.
Table notes: Asy. s.e. in parentheses. Dependent variable is the number of new CEI ﬁlings of a given type per quarter except for the
Cox model, for which it is the interarrival times of the ﬁlings. The conditional mean of the dependent variable is exponential-linear in
the covariates. Excluded carrier dummy is AT&T. All covariates are in logs, and adjusted by GDP deﬂator where appropriate. Income
data are from BEA REIS, ﬁrm R&D data from the FCC Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, industry R&D data from
the NSF R&D in Industry, Competitive Access Providers (CAPs) from NPRG Local Telecom Competition Report and FCC Fiber
Deployment Update, and communications industry GSP (net of BOC contributions) from BEA Gross Product by Industry.
Table 4: Estimation Results for the Innovation Model (Independent Version)
53Estimated Yearly Length of Predicted Number of Actual Number of
New Plans and Interim New Services∗ New Services∗
Carrier Amendments∗ (in years) During Interim During Interim
Ameritech 0.96 2.57 2.47 6
Bell Atlantic 1.81 2.59 4.68 1
BellSouth 0.96 1.49 1.43 2
NYNEX 0.68 2.07 1.41 2
PacBell 0.87 1.64 1.42 6
SWBT 1.39 2.19 3.02 3
U S West 0.72 2.59 1.87 6∗
Total 7.39 16.30 26∗
∗Excludes waivers. Waiver requests were permitted and observed during the interim, and thus do not
need to be predicted.
Table note: predictions are based on the Poisson ﬁxed eﬀects model estimated with data from the
regulated era. A prediction that diﬀers from the actual number of services created is evidence that
innovation changed when the ﬁrms were released from regulation.




























Figure 2: The Innovation and Regulatory Delay Model
54Prediction∗ 95% P-value of
(Assuming No Prediction Actual Number of
Structural Change) Interval† Interim Services‡
Poisson Model 16.30 (7.5, 25.6) 0.0197
Generalized Poisson Model
Fixed Eﬀects 16.13 (7.6, 25.8) 0.0225
Congestion 13.35 (5.7, 21.9) 0.0024
Economic Variables 13.09 (6.4, 22.9) 0.0048
Cox Model 15.01 (7.8, 23.1) 0.0048
∗Excludes waivers. Waiver requests were permitted and observed during the interim, and thus do not
need to be predicted.
†95% centered prediction interval based on bootstrap prediction errors (see notes 18 and 32).
‡One-sided p-value of 26 services.
Table notes: predictions calculated using actual covariates during interim period.
Table 6: Predictions and Prediction Intervals for the Innovation of Information Services During
the Interim Period
Obser- First Third
vations Min. Quartile Median Mean Quartile Max.
Original Data
complete spells 68 0.13 0.34 0.49 0.56 0.63 1.82
censored spells 14 0.12 0.34 0.47 0.66 0.71 1.76
all spells 82 0.12 0.34 0.49 0.57 0.65 1.82
Modiﬁed Data
(split for straddles)
all spells 245 0.00 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.25
Table notes: units of observation are ym for the original data and ymj −ym(j−1) for the modiﬁed data,
in years. See Section 4 for variable deﬁnitions and details on splitting straddling observations.
Table 7: Summary Statistics for the Regulatory Approval Delay Data
55Weibull Model Generalized Weibull Model
Variable Fixed Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects Congestion Covariates
intercept −0.655∗∗∗ −0.403 −0.349 −0.464∗∗
(0.239) (0.303) (0.280) (0.228)
BOC (not AT&T) 0.318 0.242 0.288 0.041
(0.251) (0.257) (0.257) (0.227)
amendment −0.095 −0.341 −0.437∗ −0.674∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.290) (0.258) (0.231)
waiver 0.144 0.044 0.017 0.262
(0.238) (0.255) (0.240) (0.195)
me-too ﬁling −0.522∗∗ −0.504∗∗ −0.442∗ −0.363∗∗
(0.229) (0.238) (0.231) (0.177)
reﬁled 0.389 0.354 0.357 0.255
(0.332) (0.302) (0.299) (0.248)
ﬁlings awaiting approval −0.107 −0.131
at start of spell (0.140) (0.113)
ﬁlings arriving during −0.288∗∗ −0.133
spell (0.119) (0.102)




σ (Weibull 0.613∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
shape parameter) (0.060) (0.067) (0.065) (0.049)
τ2 (heterogeneity 0.000 0.323∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.103
parameter) (ﬁxed) (0.131) (0.128) (0.129)
predicted mean duration (years) 0.620 0.703 0.757 0.585
(ave. in sample)
log likelihood −19.79 −18.59 −16.30 7.34
observations 245 245 245 189
* = 10% level signiﬁcance; ** = 5% level signiﬁcance; *** = 1% level signiﬁcance; stars for σ and τ2
b a s e do no n e - s i d e dt e s t .
Table notes: asy. s.e. in parentheses. The conditional mean of log dependent variable is linear in the
regressors.
Table 8: Estimation Results for the Regulatory Approval Delay Model (Independent Version)













BOC ﬁxed eﬀects included not
included
Regulatory Delay Duration Model
intercept −0.283 −0.367
(0.277) (0.263)










ﬁlings awaiting approval −0.210




ρ (innovation and −0.887∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗
delay correlation) (0.027) (0.014)
σ (Weibull shape 0.541∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗
parameter) (0.060) (0.060)
τ1 (innovation random 0.403∗∗ 0.388∗∗
eﬀect parameter) (0.185) (0.195)
τ2 (regulatory delay random 0.349∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗
eﬀect parameter) (0.119) (0.135)
log likelihood −254.16 −256.98
observations (counts + durations) 784 + 245 784 + 245
* = 10% level signiﬁcance; ** = 5% level signiﬁcance; *** = 1% level signiﬁcance; stars for σ, τ1,a n d
τ2 based on one-sided test.
Table notes: asy. s.e. in parentheses. See notes to Tables 4 and 8.
Table 9: Estimation Results for the Full Model (Joint Version)
57Scenario 1: Scenario 2:
CEI Regime Conditions Interim Conditions Diﬀerence
Observation Period (years) 11.00 11.00
Projected Services Created 92.46 140.30
Projected Services Not Approved 5.74 0.00
Projected Services Introduced 86.72 140.30 53.58
standard deviation 10.69 11.84 15.96
Table notes: Services Not Approved are arrivals still awaiting regulatory approval at end of period. See
text and notes 43, 44 for details.
Table 10: Projections for the Innovation and Introduction of Information Services During the
Entire Observation Period


































Data and smoothed trend
Figure 3: CEI Filings Awaiting Regulatory Approval
58